 Early-13th-century Mencius printing held in National Palace Museum | |
| Author | Mencius |
|---|---|
| Country | China |
| Language | Chinese |
| Genre | Philosophy |
Publication date | c. 300 BC |
| Mencius | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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 "Mencius" in seal script (top) and regular (bottom) Chinese characters | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Chinese name | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Chinese | 孟子 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Hanyu Pinyin | Mèngzǐ | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Literal meaning | "[The Writings of] Master Meng" | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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| Vietnamese name | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Vietnamese alphabet | Mạnh Tử | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Chữ Hán | 孟子 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Korean name | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Hangul | 맹자 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Hanja | 孟子 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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| Japanese name | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Kanji | 孟子 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Kana | もうし | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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| Part of a series on |
| Confucianism |
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The Mencius (Chinese: 孟子; pinyin: Mèngzǐ; Old Chinese: *mˤraŋ-s tsəʔ) is a collection of conversations, anecdotes, and series of genuine and imagined interviews by the Confucian philosopher Mencius.[1] The book is one of the Chinese Thirteen Classics, and explores Mencius' views on the topics of moral and political philosophy, often as a dialogue with the ideas presented by Confucianism.[2][1] The interviews and conversations are depicted as being either between Mencius and the various rulers of the Warring States period, or with his students and other contemporaries. The book documents Mencius' travel across the states, and his philosophical conversations and debates with those he meets on his journey.[2] A number of scholars suggest that the text was not written by Mencius himself, but rather by his disciples.[3] The text is believed to have been written during the late 4th century BC.[3]
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PHILOSOPHY - Ancient: Mengzi (Mencius) on Human Nature [HD]
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Mengzi shuo Mencius Book 1a
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Ethical Rudeness | The Philosophy of Mencius
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Mengzi shuo Mencius Book 7a
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Mencius
Transcription
(calm music) - Hi everybody, I'm Matt Walker. I teach philosophy and humanities at Yale-NUS College in Singapore. Today, I'm going to take a look at Mengzi's views on human nature. In particular, I'm going to take a look at Mengzi's defense of the claim that human nature is good. Mengzi, also known as Mencius, was an early Confucian philosopher. He lived in the 300s BCE. Like Confucius, Mengzi was concerned to defend a certain conception of the good life for human beings. Call this conception of the good life, the Confucian Way, or the Confucian Dao. According to the Confucian Way, possessing virtues like benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom are central to a life well-lived. When Mengzi says that human nature is good, Mengzi's thought is that human beings have innate potentials, or predispositions toward such virtues. We naturally tend toward these virtues. As Mengzi says, benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom, are not welded to us externally. We inherently have them. In presenting this view, Mengzi uses an agricultural metaphor. He describes these potentials and predispositions as sprouts of virtue. Mengzi, in turn, locates these sprouts of virtue in the heart, or heart-mind, which Mengzi identifies as the seat of our cognitive and effective dispositions. Mengzi's thought is, that if we fully cultivate our sprouts, if we tend to our predispositions toward virtue and become fully virtuous, then we will bring our human nature to full fruition. We will flourish as human beings. But what evidence does Mengzi adduce for the view that human nature is good? On what basis, in other words, does Mengzi think that we have such predispositions toward benevolence, righteousness, and the like? Here, I want to take a look at one of the most famous arguments in the Mengzi. It appears in Mengzi 2A6. Like some other famous arguments in the history of philosophy, it involves a thought experiment. I'll call Mengzi's thought experiment, "The Child and The Well Case." Ladies and Gentleman, meet little Ria. Suppose that little Ria is toddling right along through this field. And suppose further that she's heading obliviously right toward this scary-looking well. There's the well, there's little Ria toddling along, getting closer, Ahhhh! I guess I should add that what you saw was only a dramatization. According to Mengzi, anyone who saw little Ria about to toddle into that well would have an immediate, non-reflective gut reaction. As Mengzi says in 2A6, anyone would feel a surge of alarm and compassion. Indeed, simply imagining the child in the well case vividly to yourselves, you might feel something of this alarm. Okay, so what should we conclude from Mengzi's "Child and The Well" thought experiment? According to Mengzi, our non-reflective gut reaction to little Ria's looming danger shows that we have innate predispositions toward benevolence. On Mengzi's view, our response to little Ria's potential disaster is hard-wired. Human beings, by nature, are simply pre-disposed to respond with alarm and compassion when they see defenseless innocents about to face harm. Our alarm and compassion, Mengzi insists, reveals the sprout of benevolence in human nature. To be sure, it doesn't show that we possess the fully-developed virtue of benevolence, but Mengzi thinks that it reveals the germ, or bud of benevolence. The kind of proto-version of benevolence that can be cultivated to maturity. Mengzi recognizes, however, that one might offer different accounts of our reactions. According to one alternative proposal, perhaps one's response to little Ria's danger is instrumentally motivated. In other words, maybe one feels alarm and compassion for little Ria because one has certain ends in view, or because one has ulterior motives. Mengzi, however, rejects this instrumental account. Hearing about little Ria, Mengzi says, one would feel alarm and compassion not because one sought to get in good with the child's parents, not because one wanted fame among their neighbors and friends, and not because one would dislike the sound of the child's cries. What's important, Mengzi thinks, is that our alarmed and compassionate response is spontaneous and unthinking. That shows that our response emerges without calculation. Still, Mengzi's view of human nature faces another challenge. It seems demonstrably false that human nature is good. If human nature is good, then vice should be rare. We shouldn't often see brutishness, plunder, banality, selfishness, petty tyranny, and other nasty traits, but vice isn't rare. Hence, it might seem Mengzi's view is wrong. Contrary to Mengzi, it might seem human nature is bad. When faced with this kind of challenge, Mengzi's strategy is to get human nature off the hook. If human beings are bad, Mengzi argues, it's not because their nature is bad. Mengzi puts the point this way. "As for their essence, human beings can become good. "This is what I mean by calling their nature as good. "As for their becoming not good, "this is not the fault of their potential." Or, as Mengzi puts the point elsewhere, it is not the case that only the worthy person has this heart, that is the heart, or sprout of courage. All human beings have it, the worthy person simply never loses it. In other words, Mengzi is fully aware that the world is full of bad human beings. But Mengzi suggests, don't blame human nature for such badness. Instead, blame the stunting of human nature for such badness. Human nature does have predispositions toward virtue, but these predispositions can be corrupted. To spell out this response, Mengzi offers a parable. The Parable of Ox Mountain, which appears in Mengzi 6A8. Here is Ox Mountain, by nature it's verdant, and woody, and it's soil is rich. But if hatchets and axes and grazing oxen and sheep have their day at the vegetation on Ox Mountain, you shouldn't be surprised if the mountain becomes barren. Here, Mengzi holds, there's no reason to think that Ox Mountain is naturally barren. Likewise, Mengzi insists, human beings, by nature, have predispositions toward benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom. But if one grows up in a chaotic environment, neglected by narcissistic parents, surrounded by too much money, and free to run wild with impunity, then don't be surprised if one's own good nature similarly loses its capacity to blossom. Yet, as with Ox Mountain, Mengzi believes there's no reason to think that human beings are naturally bad. For Mengzi, cultivating virtue does not constitute a mutilation or radical transformation of one's human nature, cultivating benevolence and righteousness is not like making a willow tree into cups and bowls. In other words, ethical education is not a kind of maiming. On the contrary, Mengzi thinks that ethical education is like good gardening. It constitutes a tending that enables innate tendencies to reach fruition. So, to return to the point about the willow tree, ethical education is more like caring for, and nurturing the willow tree so that it reaches its full growth.
History
Mencius' core ideas on education and human nature were largely shaped during the Warring States period (c. 770–221 B.C.).[4] When the Zhou dynasty was ended by the Qin in the middle of this conflict, Mencius and other scholars went to the different kingdoms and advised the rulers and people like in the jixia academy. It was during this time that Mencius was able to access, and further developed the philosophical doctrines of Confucius. The creation of the Mencius, serves as a further elaboration on the Confucian school of thought called 'subjective idealism'.[5][4] Through this work, Mencius developed the theory of natural goodness (xingshan), that confers that all people have an intrinsic cardinal virtues, and that these virtues are developed in the same way that knowledge is cultivated.[6][5][4]
The Mencius came to be regarded as one of the most important texts that explores the philosophy of Confucianism.[2] Mainly, due to its philosophical dialogue with the Analects of Confucius.[1][2] Despite this noted importance, the Mencius was not canonized as one of the Chinese Classics until over 1,000 years later during the Song-dynasty.[3][2]
Interpretations
Various interpretations exist of the Mencius as a philosophical and literary text.[1][5] Academics E. Bruce and A. Taeko Brooks state that these various interpretations belong to a continuous discourse that represents each new generation of readers.[1] Examples are scholars such as James Legge, who opened the text to Western readers by comparatively exploring the Mencius through a Victorian missionary perspective.[6] The text's ability to transcend culture and time is seen by scholars such as Behuniak Jr. as what canonises the Mencius as a world classic.[5]
Contents
There are seven chapters within the Mencius, each divided into two halves.[6] The book's narrative depicts its characters' extensive dialogues on specific philosophical arguments, alongside Mencius's own reflections upon them in the form of short sentences. Most of the chapters that explores Mencius' moral philosophy, are structured in the form of a conversation between Mencius and other philosophical thinkers. While chapters that offer Mencius' political advice and counsel are depicted as conversations with various rulers and himself.[6]
The book explores Mencius' most famous idea, in that there exists an intrinsic human nature that is good.[6] His argument that each person possessed an inborn potential of virtue, contrasts with the position of contemporary figure Yang Zhu, who argued that that human nature is motivated by self-interest.[2] Alongside this, the Mencius largely expands on Confucian ideas of political ruling, and benevolent politics.[4][6][5]
Moral Philosophy
In the Mencius, debates about morality and human nature are in direct dialogue with Confucian views.[6][5] The theory of 'natural goodness', where human beings are inherently good, are explored through a concept of "sprouts".[7][5] According to Mencius, "sprouts" are unlearned moral habits that are inborn and present at a person's birth. These moral habits are related to one's "family affection" (qīn 親), and like "sprouts", grow out within the environment of familial activities.[7]
There exists four virtues of morality that makes up one's "sprouts" (duān 端):
The four sprouts are what distinguish humans from other beings.[5] However, there exists a distinction in that they are not what constructs humanity, but rather, something innate in which all humans already have.[5] The Mencius states that these virtues develop in the acculturation of one's environment, "just as we have four limbs" (Mencius 2A:6).[8][5] This environment being family affection, where the "four sprouts" activates amongst other unmonitored impulses.[7]
Mencius also thinks that there exists a common human nature that causes people to respond the same way to certain ethical situations. One of the most famous arguments for this is presented within the Mencius in the chapter 1A:6,[8] where Mencius successfully predicts an observer's immediate reaction to seeing a child about to fall into a well.[9] Mencius argues that all people have a biological or inborn compassion, and goes further to imply that this inborn compassion is also a universal duty.[9] Mencius refers to the idea of a biological sense of compassion as a form of duty in:
"our sense of duty pleases the heart just as meat pleases the tastebuds." (Mencius 4A:2)[9][8]
In other words, in doing compassionate things, we not only please ourselves biologically but also dutifully.[9]
Political Philosophy
The Mencius expands on the Confucian claims about the necessary practices of a good ruler.[8][5][7] This consists of "virtue politics" (de zheng 德政), "benevolent politics" (ren zheng 仁政), or "politics that is sensitive to the suffering of others" (bùrěn rén zhī zhèng 不忍人之政).[7] These terms refers to the ideal way of governing politically, which is that a society must have policies that extends benevolently. These consists of fairness in goods distribution, and mainly policies that protect the most marginal societal members. Confucius, and in extension, Mencius contends that a good ruler must gain the devotion of the people through the exertion of benevolence and goodness. Mencius asserts Confucian ethics as the basis to achieving an ideal state.[7][4]
Within the Mencius, this is expressed in his encounter with King Xuan of Qi, who rules over the Central Kingdom without practicing "benevolent politics". In this chapter, Mencius refers to the King's action as:
"looking for fish by climbing a tree." (yuán mù qiú yú 緣木求魚) (Mencius 2A:4)[7][8]
Other passages within the Mencius addresses benevolent politics more directly:
"An Emperor cannot keep the Empire within the Four Seas unless he is benevolent; a feudal lord cannot preserve the altars to the gods of earth and grain unless he is benevolent; a Minister or a Counsellor cannot preserve his ancestral temple unless he is benevolent; a junzi or a commoner cannot preserve his four limbs unless he is benevolent. Now if one dislikes death yet revels in cruelty, he is just like someone who drinks alcohol beyond his capacity while he dislikes drunkenness." (Mencius 4A:3)[8][7]
Mencius also counsels against the political use of violence and force:
"When one uses force to win people's allegiance (yǐ lǐ fú rén 以理服人), one does not win people's hearts and minds (xīn fú 心服); they submit to your force because they are not strong enough." (Mencius 4A: 7)[8][7]
Influences on Hermeneutics
Asides from its influences on Neo-Confucianism. The Mencius has also had an effect on the field of literary discourse in China.[10][11] Mainly, in the advancement of Chinese literary criticism into a direction that resembles the methods of Western intentionalist hermeneutics.[11][10] These intentionalist concepts of interpretation (termed Mencian literary criticism), are seen as having dominated the methodology of literary criticism and interpretation in China ever since.[11]
The Western intentionalist position traditionally judges the meaning of a literary work by the intentions of the author at the moment of its conception.[11] Jane Gearney notes, that there exist various passages within The Mencius that propose a theory of literary interpretation that resembles this tradition.[11] An example being:
". . . one who explains poetry should not let the form obstruct the phrases or let the phrases obstruct the drift. One should meet the drift with one's own thoughts—that's how to obtain it." (Mencius 5A:4)[8][11]
In her evaluation of this passage, Gearney notes that the "drift" being referred to here can be understood as the author's intention.[11] In this passage, Mencius poses that when it comes to evaluating a text, its form or structure should not come before the individual phrases. While the individual phrases should not obstruct the authorial intention (the drift) of the work, where the intention is met with the reader's own thoughts to form meaning.[11] Mencius also encourages a friendship-based approach to literary criticism:
"The good scholars of a village befriend other good scholars of the village. The good scholars of the world befriend other good scholars of the world. If befriending the good scholars in the world isn't enough, they also proceed to consider the ancients. But how can they recite their poetry and read their books without knowing what kind of people they are? Therefore, they consider their age. This is "proceeding to befriend" [the ancients]." (Mencius 5B:8)[8][11]
The idea of knowing authors as people, is seen by Gearney as Mencius' suggestion for the reader to attempt to learn, as best they can, the author's intention when they were creating the text.[11] Mencius emphasises knowing the author as a person, to suggest the importance of the setting and temporal context of a literary work in one's evaluation of it.[11]
Though Mencian literary criticism is seen as having fostered intentionalist hermeneutics in China.[11][12] Gearney notes that the form of intentionalism within the book differs from the style of traditional Western intentionalist modes of criticism.[11] This difference is mainly to do with Mencius' emphasis on learning the author's contextual settings during the conception of the work, instead of the author's own feelings during its conception.[11] Hence, the standard by which a work should be analysed does not involve the sentiments of the author at the exact moment of conception (as characterised by E.D Hirsh).[11] But rather, Mencius' standards posits that one should become acquainted with the author's personal, cultural, and political context, before evaluating the literary work.[11]
Selected translations
- Legge, James (1895). The Works of Mencius. The Chinese Classics. Vol. 2. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Lyall, Leonard A. (1932). Mencius. London: Longmans, Green and Co.
- Ware, James R. (1960). The Sayings of Mencius. New York: Mentor Books.
- Dobson, W. A. C. H. (1963). Mencius, A New Translation Arranged and Annotated for the General Reader. London: Oxford University Press.
- Lau, D. C. (1970). Mencius. London: Penguin Books. ISBN 9780140442281.
- Van Norden, Bryan (2008). Mencius: With Selections from Traditional Commentaries. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.
- Bloom, Irene (2009). Mencius. New York: Columbia University Press.
References
Footnotes
- ^ a b c d e Brooks, E. Bruce; Brooks, A. Taeko (2017-12-31), "11. The Nature and Historical Context of the Mencius", Mencius, University of Hawaii Press, pp. 242–281, doi:10.1515/9780824863609-013, ISBN 978-0-8248-6360-9
- ^ a b c d e f Fuller, Michael A. (2004-07-01). An Introduction to Literary Chinese. Harvard University Asia Center. doi:10.2307/j.ctt1tg5n4n. ISBN 978-1-68417-322-8.
- ^ a b c Kern, Martin (2010-04-01), "Early Chinese literature, beginnings through Western Han", The Cambridge History of Chinese Literature, Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–115, doi:10.1017/chol9780521855587.003, ISBN 978-1-139-09541-9
- ^ a b c d e Zhengming, Ge (1994). "Mencius". Prospects. 24 (1–2): 121–130. doi:10.1007/bf02199011. ISSN 0033-1538.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l Behuniak, James (2011). "Naturalizing Mencius". Philosophy East and West. 61 (3): 492–515. doi:10.1353/pew.2011.0045. ISSN 1529-1898. S2CID 201778623.
- ^ a b c d e f g Mencius. (2013). The Life and Works of Mencius. Neeland Media LLC. ISBN 978-1-4209-4816-5. OCLC 1028955469.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j Xiao, Yang (2009). "Agency and Practical Reasoning in The Analects and The Mencius". Journal of Chinese Philosophy. 36 (4): 269–241. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6253.2009.01546.x.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i Coleman, Earle J.; Lau, D. C. (1976). "Mencius". Philosophy East and West. 22 (1): 113. doi:10.2307/1397970. ISSN 0031-8221. JSTOR 1397970.
- ^ a b c d Munro, Donald J. (2017-12-31), Chan, Alan K. L (ed.), "13. Mencius and an Ethics of the New Century", Mencius, University of Hawaii Press, pp. 305–316, doi:10.1515/9780824863609-015, ISBN 978-0-8248-6360-9
- ^ a b Zhang, Longxi (1994). The tao and the logos : literary hermeneutics, East and West. Duke University Press. ISBN 0-8223-1211-5. OCLC 1043024926.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p Gearney, Jane (2000). "Mencius's Hermeneutics". Journal of Chinese Philosophy. 27 (1): 93–100. doi:10.1111/0301-8121.00005. ISSN 0301-8121.
- ^ Liu, James J. (1986). Chinese theories of literature. Univ. of Chicago Pr. ISBN 0-226-48693-1. OCLC 313041189.
Works cited
- Behuniak, James (2011). "Naturalizing Mencius". Philosophy East and West. 61 (3): 492–515. doi:10.1353/pew.2011.0045. JSTOR 23015355. S2CID 201778623.
- Chan, Alan K.L (2002). Mencius: Contexts and Interpretations. Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press. pp. 242–281.
- Fuller, Michael A (2004). An Introduction to Literary Chinese. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Asia Center: Distributed by Harvard University Press. ISBN 0-674-01726-9.
- Gearney, Jane (2000). "Mencius' Hermeneutics". Journal of Chinese Philosophy. 27: 93–100. doi:10.1111/0301-8121.00005.
- Kern, Martin (2010). "Early Chinese literature, Beginnings through Western Han". In Owen, Stephen (ed.). The Cambridge History of Chinese Literature, Volume I: To 1375. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 1–115. ISBN 978-0-521-85558-7.
- Lau, D. C. (1993). "Meng tzu 孟子 (Mencius)". In Loewe, Michael (ed.). Early Chinese Texts: A Bibliographical Guide. Berkeley: Society for the Study of Early China; Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley. pp. 331–335. ISBN 1-55729-043-1.
- Xiao, Yang (2009). "Agency and Practical Reasoning in the Analects and the Mencius". Journal of Chinese Philosophy. 36 (4): 629–641. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6253.2009.01546.x.
- Zheming, Ge (1994). "Mencius". Prospects. 24 (1–2): 121–130. doi:10.1007/BF02199011.
External links
Works related to Mencius at Wikisource- The Works of Mencius: Legge's English translation
- Mengzi Chinese text with Legge's English translation
- Mencius (Selections), translated by A. Charles Muller
- Mencius 《孟子》 Chinese and English text with matching English vocabulary at Chinese Notes
This page was last edited on 15 March 2024, at 22:57