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The Limits to Growth

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Limits to Growth
First edition cover
Authors
LanguageEnglish
Published2 March 1972; 52 years ago (1972-03-02)[1]
PublisherPotomac Associates – Universe Books
Pages205
ISBN0-87663-165-0
OCLC307838
digital: Digitized 1972 edition

The Limits to Growth (often abbreviated LTG) is a 1972 report[2] that discussed the possibility of exponential economic and population growth with finite supply of resources, studied by computer simulation.[3] The study used the World3 computer model to simulate the consequence of interactions between the Earth and human systems.[a][4] The model was based on the work of Jay Forrester of MIT,[2]: 21  as described in his book World Dynamics.[5]

Commissioned by the Club of Rome, the study saw its findings first presented at international gatherings in Moscow and Rio de Janeiro in the summer of 1971.[2]: 186  The report's authors are Donella H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows, Jørgen Randers, and William W. Behrens III, representing a team of 17 researchers.[2]: 8 

The report's findings suggest that, in the absence of significant alterations in resource utilization, it is highly likely that there will be an abrupt and unmanageable decrease in both population and industrial capacity. Despite the report's facing severe criticism and scrutiny upon its release, subsequent research consistently finds that the global use of natural resources has been inadequately reformed since to alter its basic predictions.

Since its publication, some 30 million copies of the book in 30 languages have been purchased.[6] It continues to generate debate and has been the subject of several subsequent publications.[7]

Beyond the Limits and The Limits to Growth: The 30-Year Update were published in 1992 and 2004 respectively;[8][9] in 2012, a 40-year forecast from Jørgen Randers, one of the book's original authors, was published as 2052: A Global Forecast for the Next Forty Years;[10] and in 2022 two of the original Limits to Growth authors, Dennis Meadows and Jørgen Randers, joined 19 other contributors to produce Limits and Beyond.[11]

World3 Model Standard Run as shown in The Limits to Growth

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Transcription

Incubate Pictures presents In association with Post Carbon Institute There's No Tomorrow This is the earth, as it looked 90 million years ago. Geologists call this period the 'Late Cretaceous'. It was a time of extreme global warming, When dinosaurs still ruled the planet. They went about their lives, secure in their place at the top of the food chain, oblivious of the changes taking place around them. The continents were drifting apart, opening huge rifts in the Earth's crust. They flooded, becoming seas. Algae thrived in the extreme heat, poisoning the water. They died, and fell, in their trillions, to the bottom of the rifts. Rivers washed sediment into the seas, until the organic remains of the algae were buried. As the pressure grew, so did the heat, until a chemical reaction transformed the organics into hydrocarbon fossil fuels: Oil and Natural Gas. A similar process occurred on land, which produced coal. It took nature about 5 million years to create the fossil fuels that the world consumes in 1 year. The modern way of life is dependent on this fossilised sunlight, although a surprising number of people take it for granted. Since 1860, geologists have discovered over 2 trillion barrels of oil. Since then, the world has used approximately half. Before you can pump oil, you have to discover it. At first it was easy to find, and cheap to extract. The first great American oilfield was Spindletop, discovered in 1900 Many more followed. Geologists scoured America. They found enormous deposits of oil, natural gas and coal. America produced more oil than any other country, enabling it to become an industrial super-power. Once an oil well starts producing oil, it's only a matter of time before it enters a decline. Individual wells have different production rates. When many wells are averaged together, the combined graph looks like a bell curve. Typically it takes 40 years after the peak of discovery for a country to reach its peak of production, after which it enters a permanent fall. In the 1950s, Shell geophysicist M. King Hubbert predicted that America's oil production would peak in 1970, 40 years after the peak of U.S. oil discovery. Few believed him. However, in 1970, American oil production peaked, and entered a permanent decline. Hubbert was vindicated. From this point on, America would depend increasingly on imported oil. This made her vulnerable to supply disruptions, and contributed to the economic mayhem of the 1973 and 1979 oil shocks. The 1930s saw the highest rate of oil discoveries in U.S. history. In spite of advanced technology, the decline in the discovery of new American oilfields has been relentless. More recent finds, such as ANWAR, would at best provide enough oil for 17 months. Even the new "Jack 2" field in the gulf of Mexico would only supply a few months of domestic demand. Though large, neither field comes close to satisfying America's energy requirements. Evidence is now mounting that world oil production is peaking, or is close to it. Globally, the rate of discovery of new oilfields peaked in the 1960s. Over 40 years later, the decline in the discovery of new fields seems unstoppable. 54 of the 65 major oil producing nations have already peaked in production. Many of the others are expected to follow in the near future. The world will need to bring the equivalent of a new Saudi Arabia into production every three years to make up for declining output in existing oilfields. In the nineteen sixties, six barrels of oil were found for every one that was used. Four decades later, the world consumes between three and six barrels of oil for every one that it finds. Once the peak of world oil production is reached, demand for oil will outstrip supply, and the price of gasoline will fluctuate wildly, affecting far more than the cost of filling a car. Modern cities are fossil fuel dependent. Even roads are made from asphalt, a petroleum product, as are the roofs of many homes. Large areas would be uninhabitable without heating in the winter or air conditioning in the summer. Suburban sprawl encourages people to drive many miles to work, school and stores. Major cities have been zoned with residential and commercial areas placed far apart, forcing people to drive. Suburbia, and many communities were designed on the assumption of plentiful oil and energy. Chemicals derived from fossil fuels, or Petro-chemicals, are essential in the manufacture of countless products. The modern system of agriculture is heavily dependent on fossil fuels, as are hospitals, aviation, water distribution systems, and the U.S. military, which alone uses about 140 million barrels of oil a year. Fossil fuels are also essential for the creation of plastics and polymers, key ingredients in computers, entertainment devices and clothing. The global economy currently depends on endless growth, demanding an increasing supply of cheap energy. We are so dependant on oil and other fossil fuels, that even a small disruption in supply may have far-reaching effects on every aspect of our lives. ENERGY Energy is the ability to do work. The average American today has available the energy equivalent of 150 slaves, working 24 hours a day. Materials that store this energy for work are called fuels, Some fuels contain more energy than others. This is called energy density. Of these fuels, oil is the most critical. The world consumes 30 billion barrels a year, equal to 1 cubic mile of oil, which contains as much energy as would be generated from 52 nuclear power plants working for the next 50 years. Although oil only generates 1.6% of U.S. electricity, it powers 96% of all transportation. In 2008, two thirds of America's oil was imported. Most was from Canada, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Nigeria, Iraq and Angola. Several factors make oil unique: it is energy dense. One barrel of oil contains the energy equivalent of almost three years of human labour. It is liquid at room temperature, easy to transport and usable in small engines. To acquire energy, you have to use energy. The trick is to use smaller amounts to find and extract larger amounts. This is called EROEI: Energy Return on Energy Invested. Conventional oil is a good example. The easy to extract, high-quality crude was pumped first. Oilmen spent the energy equivalent of 1 barrel of oil to find and extract 100. The EROEI of oil was 100. As the easy to find oil was pumped first, exploration moved into deep waters, or distant countries, using increasing amounts of energy to do so. Often, the oil we find now is heavy or sour crude, and is expensive to refine. The EROEI for oil today is as low as 10. If you use more energy to get the fuel than is contained in the fuel, it's not worth the effort to get it. It is possible to convert one fuel source into another. Every time you do so, some of the energy contained in the original fuel is lost. For instance, there is unconventional oil: Tar Sands and Shale. Tar Sands are found mainly in Canada. Two thirds of the world's shale is in the US. Both of these fuels can be converted to synthetic crude oil. However, this requires large amounts of heat and fresh water, reducing their EROEI, which varies from five, to as low as one and a half. Shale is an exceptionally poor fuel, pound for pound containing about one third the energy of a box of breakfast cereal. Coal exists in vast quantities, and generates almost half of the planet's electricity. The world uses almost 2 cubic miles of coal a year. However, Global coal production may peak before 2040. The claim that America has centuries worth of coal is deceptive, as it fails to account for growing demand, and decreasing quality. Much of the high quality anthracite coal is gone, leaving lower quality coal that is less energy dense. Production issues arise, as surface coal is depleted, and miners have to dig deeper and in less accessible areas. Many use destructive mountaintop removal to reach coal deposits, causing environmental mayhem. Natural gas is often found alongside oil and coal. North American discovery of conventional gas peaked in the 1950s, and production peaked in the early 70s. If the discovery graph is moved forward by 23 years, the possible future of North American conventional natural gas production is revealed. Recent breakthroughs have allowed the extraction of unconventional natural gas, such as shale gas, which might help offset decline in the years ahead. Unconventional natural gas is controversial, as it needs high energy prices to be profitable. Even with Unconventional gas, there may be a peak in global natural gas production by 2030. Large uranium reserves for nuclear fission still exist. To replace the 10 terawatts the world currently generates from fossil fuels, would require 10,000 nuclear power plants. At that rate, the known reserves of uranium would last for only 10 to 20 years. Experiments with plutonium based fast-breeder reactors in France and Japan have been expensive failures. Nuclear fusion faces massive technical obstacles. Then there are the renewables. Windpower has a high EROEI, but is intermittent. Hydro power is reliable, but most rivers in the developed world are already dammed. Conventional geothermal power plants use existing hotspots near the Earth's surface. They are limited to those areas. In the experimental EGS system, two shafts would be drilled 6 miles deep. Water is pumped down one shaft, to be heated in fissures, then rise up the other, generating power. According to a recent MIT report, this technology might supply 10% of US electricity by 2050. Wave power is restricted to coastal areas. The energy density of waves varies from region to region. Transporting wave-generated electricity inland would be challenging. Also, the salty ocean environment is corrosive to turbines. Biofuels are fuels that are grown. Wood has a low energy density, and grows slowly. The world uses 3.7 cubic miles of wood a year. Biodiesel and ethanol are made from crops grown by petroleum powered agriculture. The energy profit from these fuels is very low. Some politicians want to turn corn into ethanol. Using Ethanol to supply one tenth of projected US oil use in 2020, would require 3% of America's Land. To supply one third would require 3 times the area now used to grow food. To supply all US petroleum consumption in 2020 would take twice as much land as is used to grow food. Hydrogen has to be extracted from Natural Gas, coal or water, which uses more energy than we get from the Hydrogen. This makes a Hydrogen economy unlikely. All the world's photovoltaic solar panels generate as much electricity as two coal power plants. The equivalent of between 1 and 4 tons of coal are used in the manufacture of a single solar panel. We'd have to cover as many as 140,000 square miles with panels to meet current world demand. As of 2007, there are only about 4 square miles. Concentrated Solar Power, or Solar Thermal has great potential, though at the moment there are only a small number of plants operating. They are also limited to sunny climates, requiring large amounts of electricity to be transmitted over long distances. All of the alternatives to oil depend on oil-powered machinery, or require materials such as plastics that are produced from oil. When considering future claims of amazing new fuels or inventions, ask: Does the advocate have a working, commercial model of the invention? What is its energy density? Can it be stored or easily distributed? Is it reliable or intermittent? Can it be scaled to a national level? Are there hidden engineering challenges? What is the EROEI? What are the environmental impacts? Remember that large numbers can be deceptive. For example: 1 billion barrels of oil will satisfy global demand for only 12 days. A transition from fossil fuels would be a monumental challenge. As of 2007, coal generates 48.5% of U.S. electricity. 21.6% is from natural gas, 1.6% is from petroleum, 19.4% is from nuclear, 5.8% is from hydro. Other renewables only generate 2.5%. Is it possible to replace a system based on fossil fuels with a patchwork of alternatives? Major technological advances are needed, as well as political will and co-operation, massive investment, international consensus, the retrofitting of the $45 trillion global economy, including transportation, manufacturing industries, and agricultural systems, as well as officials competent to manage the transition. If all these are achieved, could the current way of life continue? Growth These bacteria live in a bottle. Their population doubles every minute. At 11AM there is one bacterium. At 12 noon the bottle is full. It is half-full at 11.59 leaving only enough space for one more doubling. The bacteria see the danger. They search for new bottles, and find 3. They assume that their problem is solved. By 12 noon, the first bottle is full. By 12.01, the second bottle is full. By 12.02, all the bottles are full. This is the problem that we face, due to the doubling caused by Exponential Growth. When humanity began to use coal and oil as fuel sources, it experienced unprecedented growth. Even low growth rates produce large increases over time. At a 1% growth rate, an economy will double in 70 years. A 2% rate doubles in 35 years. At a 10% growth rate, an economy will double in only 7 years. If an economy grows at the current average of 3%, it doubles every 23 years. With each doubling, demand for energy and resources will exceed all the previous doublings combined. The financial system is built on the assumption of growth - which requires an increasing supply of energy to support it. Banks lend money they don't have, in effect creating it. The borrowers use the newly created loan money to grow their businesses, and pay back the debt, with an interest payment which requires more growth. Due to this creation of debt formed money, most of the world's money represents a debt with interest to be paid. Without continual new and ever larger generations of borrowers to produce growth, and thus pay off these debts, the world economy will collapse. Like a Ponzi Scheme, the system must expand or die. Partly through this debt system, the effects of economic growth have been spectacular: in GDP, damming of rivers, water use, fertiliser consumption, urban population, paper consumption, motor vehicles, communications and tourism. World population has grown to 7 billion, and is expected to exceed 9 billion by 2050. On a flat, infinite earth, this would not be a problem. However, as the Earth is round and finite, we will eventually face limits to growth. Economic expansion has resulted in increases in atmospheric nitrous oxide and methane, ozone depletion, increases in great floods, damage to ocean ecosystems, including nitrogen runoff, loss of rainforest and woodland, increases in domesticated land, and species exinctions. If we place a single grain of rice on the first square of a chessboard, double this and place 2 grains on the second, double again and place 4 on the third, double again and place 8 on the fourth, and continue this way, putting on each square twice the number of grains than were on the previous one, by the time we reach the final square, we need an astronomical number of grains: 9 quintillion, 223 quadrillion, 372 trillion, 36 billion, 854 million, 776 thousand grains: more grain than the human race has grown in the last 10,000 years. Modern economies, like the grains on the chess board, doubles every few decades. On which square of the chessboard are we? Besides energy, civilisation demands numerous essential resources: fresh water, topsoil, food, forests, and many kinds of minerals and metals. Growth is limited by the essential resource in scarcest supply. A barrel is made of staves, and like water filling a barrel, growth can go no further than the lowest stave, or the most limited essential resource. Humans currently utilise 40% of all photosynthesis n Earth. Though it might be possible to use 80%, we are unlikely to ever use 160%. FOOD The global food supply relies heavily on fossil fuels. Before WW1, all agriculture was Organic. Following the invention of fossil fuel derived fertilisers and pesticides there were massive improvements in food production, allowing for increases in human population. The use of artificial fertilisers has fed far more people than would have been possible with organic agriculture alone. Fossil fuels are needed for farming equipment, transportation, refrigeration, packaging - in plastic, and cooking. Modern agriculture uses land to turn fossil fuels into food - and food into people. About 7 calories of fossil-fuel energy are used to produce 1 calorie of food. In America, food travels approximately 1,500 miles from farm to customer. Besides fossil fuel decline, there are several threats to the current system of food production: Cheap energy, improved technology and subsidies have allowed massive fish catches. Global fish catches peaked in the late nineteen eighties, forcing fishermen to move into deep waters. Nitrogen run off by fossil fuel based fertilisers poisons rivers and seas, creating enormous dead zones. At this rate, all fish populations are projected to collapse by 2048. Acid rain from cities and industries leeches the soil of vital nutrients, such as potassium, calcium, and magnesium. Another threat is a lack of water. Many farms use water pumped from underground aquifers for irrigation. The aquifers need thousands of years to fill up, but can be pumped dry in a few decades, like oil wells. America's massive Ogallala aquifer has fallen so low that many farmers have had to return to less productive dry-land farming. Additionally, The use of irrigation and fertilisers can lead to salinisation: the accumulation of salt in the soil. This is a major cause of desertification. Still another threat is topsoil loss. 200 years ago, there were 6 feet of topsoil on the American prairies. Today, through tillage and poor practices, approximately half is gone. Irrigation encourages the growth of stem rust fungi like UG-99 - which has the potential to destroy 80% of the world's grain harvest. According to Norman Borlaug, father of the Green Revolution, stem rust "has immense potential for social and human destruction." The use of biofuels means that less land will be available for food production. An area has a finite carrying capacity. This is the number of animals or people that can live there indefinitely. If a species overshoots the carrying capacity of that area, it will die back until the population returns to its natural limits. The world has avoided this die-off by finding new lands to cultivate, or by increasing production, which has been possible largely thanks to oil. To continue growth, more resources are required than the Earth can provide, but no new planets are available. In the face of all these challenges, global food production must double by 2050 to feed the growing world population. 1 billion people are already malnourished or starving. There will be challenges in feeding over 9 billion in the years to come, when world oil and natural gas production will be in decline. HAPPY ENDING The global economy grows exponentially, at about 3% a year, consuming increasing amounts of non-renewable fuels, minerals and metals, as well as renewable resources like water, forests, soils and fish faster than they can be replenished. Even at a growth rate of 1%, an economy will double in 70 years. The problem is intensified by other factors: Globalisation allows people on one continent to buy goods and food made by those on another. The lines of supply are long, placing strains on a limited oil resource. We now rely on distant countries for basic necessities. Modern cities are fossil fuel dependent. Most Banking Systems are based on debt, forcing people into a spiral of loans and repayments - producing growth. What can be done in the face of these problems? Many believe that the crisis can be prevented through conservation, technology, smart growth, recycling, electric cars and hybrids, substitution, or voting. Conservation will save you money, but it alone won't save the planet. If some people cut back on oil use, the reduced demand will drive down the price, allowing others to buy it for less. In the same fashion, a more efficient engine that uses less energy will, paradoxically, lead to greater energy use. In the 19th century, English economist William Stanley Jevons realised that Better steam engines made coal a more cost effective fuel source, which led to the use of more steam engines, which increased total coal consumption. Growth of use will consume any energy or resources saved through conservation. Many believe that scientists will solve these problems with new technology. However, technology is not energy. Technology can channel energy into work, but it can't replace it. It also consumes resources: for instance; computers are made with one tenth of the energy needed to make a car. More advanced technologies may make the situation worse, as many require rare minerals, which are also approaching limits. For example, 97% of the world's Rare Earths are produced by China, most from a single mine in inner Mongolia. These minerals are used in catalytic converters, aircraft engines, high efficiency magnets and hard drives, hybrid car batteries, lasers, portable X-Rays, shielding for nuclear reactors, compact discs, hybrid vehicle motors, low energy light-bulbs, fibre optics and flat-screen displays. China has begun to consider restricting the export of these minerals, as demand soars. So called sustainable growth or smart growth won't help, as it also uses non renewable metals and minerals in ever increasing quantities, including Rare Earths. Recycling will not solve the problem, as it requires energy, and the process is not 100% efficient. It is only possible to reclaim a fraction of the material being recycled; a large portion is lost forever as waste. Electric cars run on electricity. As most power is generated from fossil fuels, this is not a solution. Also, cars of all types consume oil in their production. Each tire alone requires about 7 gallons of Petroleum. There are around 800 million cars in the world, as of 2010. At current growth rates, this number would reach 2 billion by 2025. It is unlikely that the planet can support this many vehicles for long, regardless of their power source. Many economists believe that the free market will substitute one energy source with another through technological innovation. However, the main substitutes to oil face their own decline rates. Substitution also fails to account for the time needed to prepare for a transition. The U.S. Department of Energy's Hirsch report estimates that at least 2 decades would be needed to prepare for the effects of Peak Oil. The issues of energy shortages, resource depletion, topsoil loss, and pollution are all symptoms of a single, larger problem: Growth. As long as our financial system demands endless growth, reform is unlikely to succeed. What then, will the future look like? Optimists believe that growth will continue forever, without limits. Pessimists think that we're heading towards a new Stone Age, or extinction. The truth may lie between these extremes. It is possible that society might fall back to a simpler state, one in which energy use is a lot less. This would mean a harder life for most. More manual labour, more farm work, and local production of goods, food and services. What should a person do to prepare for such a possible future? Expect a decrease in supplies of food and goods from far away places. Start walking or cycling. Get used to using less electricity. Get out of debt. Try to avoid banks. Instead of shopping at big box stores, support local businesses. Buy food grown locally, at Farmers' Markets. Instead of a lawn, consider gardening to grow your own food. Learn how to preserve it. Consider the use of local currencies should the larger economy cease to function, and develop greater self sufficiency. None of these steps will prevent Collapse, but they might improve your chances in a low energy future, one in which we will have to be more self reliant, as our ancestors once were.

Purpose

In commissioning the MIT team to undertake the project that resulted in LTG, the Club of Rome had three objectives:[2]: 185 

  1. Gain insights into the limits of our world system and the constraints it puts on human numbers and activity.
  2. Identify and study the dominant elements, and their interactions, that influence the long-term behavior of world systems.
  3. To warn of the likely outcome of contemporary economic and industrial policies, with a view to influencing changes to a sustainable lifestyle.

Method

The World3 model is based on five variables: "population, food production, industrialization, pollution, and consumption of nonrenewable natural resources".[2]: 25  At the time of the study, all these variables were increasing and were assumed to continue to grow exponentially, while the ability of technology to increase resources grew only linearly.[2] The authors intended to explore the possibility of a sustainable feedback pattern that would be achieved by altering growth trends among the five variables under three scenarios. They noted that their projections for the values of the variables in each scenario were predictions "only in the most limited sense of the word", and were only indications of the system's behavioral tendencies.[12] Two of the scenarios saw "overshoot and collapse" of the global system by the mid- to latter-part of the 21st century, while a third scenario resulted in a "stabilized world".[13]: 11 

Exponential reserve index

A key idea in The Limits to Growth is the notion that if the rate of resource use is increasing, the number of reserves cannot be calculated by simply taking the current known reserves and dividing them by the current yearly usage, as is typically done to obtain a static index. For example, in 1972, the amount of chromium reserves was 775 million metric tons, of which 1.85 million metric tons were mined annually. The static index is 775/1.85=418 years, but the rate of chromium consumption was growing at 2.6 percent annually, or exponentially.[2]: 54–71  If instead of assuming a constant rate of usage, the assumption of a constant rate of growth of 2.6 percent annually is made, the resource will instead last

In general, the formula for calculating the amount of time left for a resource with constant consumption growth is:[14]

where:

y = years left;
r = the continuous compounding growth rate;
s = R/C or static reserve;
R = reserve;
C = (annual) consumption.

Commodity reserve extrapolation

The chapter contains a large table that spans five pages in total, based on actual geological reserves data for a total of 19 non-renewable resources, and analyzes their reserves at 1972 modeling time of their exhaustion under three scenarios: static (constant growth), exponential, and exponential with reserves multiplied by 5 to account for possible discoveries. A short excerpt from the table is presented below:

Years
Resource Consumption, projected average annual growth rate Static index Exponential index 5× reserves exponential index
Chromium 2.6% 420 95 154
Gold 4.1% 11 9 29
Iron 1.8% 240 93 173
Lead 2.0% 26 21 64
Petroleum 3.9% 31 20 50

The chapter also contains a detailed computer model of chromium availability with current (as of 1972) and double the known reserves as well as numerous statements on the current increasing price trends for discussed metals:

Given present resources consumption rates and the projected increase in the rates, the great majority of the currently important nonrenewable resources will be extremely costly 100 years from now. (...) The prices of those resources with the shortest static reserve indices have already begun to increase. The price of mercury, for example, has gone up 500 percent in the last 20 years; the price of lead has increased 300 percent in the last 30 years.

— Chapter 2, page 66

Interpretations of the exhaustion model

Due to the detailed nature and use of actual resources and their real-world price trends, the indexes have been interpreted as a prediction of the number of years until the world would "run out" of them, both by environmentalist groups calling for greater conservation and restrictions on use and by skeptics criticizing the accuracy of the predictions.[15][failed verification][16][17][18] This interpretation has been widely propagated by media and environmental organizations, and authors who, apart from a note about the possibility of the future flows being "more complicated", did not clearly constrain or deny this interpretation.[19]

While environmental organizations used it to support their arguments, a number of economists used it to criticize LTG as a whole shortly after publication in the 1970s (Peter Passel, Marc Roberts, and Leonard Ross), with similar criticism reoccurring from Ronald Baily, George Goodman and others in the 1990s.[20] In 2011 Ugo Bardi in "The Limits to Growth Revisited" argued that "nowhere in the book was it stated that the numbers were supposed to be read as predictions", nonetheless as they were the only tangible numbers referring to actual resources, they were promptly picked as such by both supporters as well as opponents.[20]

While Chapter 2 serves as an introduction to the concept of exponential growth modeling, the actual World3 model uses an abstract "non-renewable resources" component based on static coefficients rather than the actual physical commodities described above.

Conclusions

After reviewing their computer simulations, the research team came to the following conclusions:[2]: 23–24 

  1. If the present growth trends in world population, industrialization, pollution, food production, and resource depletion continue unchanged, the limits to growth on this planet will be reached sometime within the next one hundred years.[b] The most probable result will be a rather sudden and uncontrollable decline in both population and industrial capacity.
  2. It is possible to alter these growth trends and to establish a condition of ecological and economic stability that is sustainable far into the future. The state of global equilibrium could be designed so that the basic material needs of each person on earth are satisfied and each person has an equal opportunity to realize his individual human potential.
  3. If the world's people decide to strive for this second outcome rather than the first, the sooner they begin working to attain it, the greater will be their chances of success.
— Limits to Growth, Introduction

The introduction goes on to say:

These conclusions are so far-reaching and raise so many questions for further study that we are quite frankly overwhelmed by the enormity of the job that must be done. We hope that this book will serve to interest other people, in many fields of study and in many countries of the world, to raise the space and time horizons of their concerns, and to join us in understanding and preparing for a period of great transition – the transition from growth to global equilibrium.

Criticism

LTG provoked a wide range of responses, including immediate criticisms almost as soon as it was published.[21][22]

Peter Passell and two co-authors published a 2 April 1972 article in the New York Times describing LTG as "an empty and misleading work ... best summarized ... as a rediscovery of the oldest maxim of computer science: Garbage In, Garbage Out". Passell found the study's simulation to be simplistic while assigning little value to the role of technological progress in solving the problems of resource depletion, pollution, and food production. They charged that all LTG simulations ended in collapse, predicting the imminent end of irreplaceable resources. Passell also charged that the entire endeavour was motivated by a hidden agenda: to halt growth in its tracks.[23]

In 1973, a group of researchers at the Science Policy Research Unit at the University of Sussex concluded that simulations in Limits to Growth were very sensitive to a few key assumptions and suggest that the MIT assumptions were unduly pessimistic, and the MIT methodology, data, and projections were faulty.[24] However, the LTG team, in a paper entitled "A Response to Sussex", described and analyzed five major areas of disagreement between themselves and the Sussex authors.[25] The team asserted that the Sussex critics applied "micro reasoning to macro problems", and suggested that their own arguments had been either misunderstood or wilfully misrepresented. They pointed out that the critics had failed to suggest any alternative model for the interaction of growth processes and resource availability, and "nor had they described in precise terms the sort of social change and technological advances that they believe would accommodate current growth processes."

During that period, the very idea of any worldwide constraint, as indicated in the study, was met with scepticism and opposition by both businesses and the majority of economists.[26] Critics declared that history proved the projections to be incorrect, such as the predicted resource depletion and associated economic collapse by the end of the 20th century.[27] The methodology, the computer, the conclusions, the rhetoric and the people behind the project were criticised.[28] Yale economist Henry C. Wallich agreed that growth could not continue indefinitely, but that a natural end to growth was preferable to intervention. Wallich stated that technology could solve all the problems the report was concerned about, but only if growth continued apace. According to Wallich's cautionary statement, prematurely halting progress would result in the perpetual impoverishment of billions.[28]

Julian Simon, a professor at the Universities of Illinois and, later, Maryland, argued that the fundamental underlying concepts of the LTG scenarios were faulty because the very idea of what constitutes a "resource" varies over time. For instance, wood was the primary shipbuilding resource until the 1800s, and there were concerns about prospective wood shortages from the 1500s on. But then boats began to be made of iron, later steel, and the shortage issue disappeared. Simon argued in his book The Ultimate Resource that human ingenuity creates new resources as required from the raw materials of the universe. For instance, copper will never "run out". History demonstrates that as it becomes scarcer its price will rise and more will be found, more will be recycled, new techniques will use less of it, and at some point a better substitute will be found for it altogether.[29] His book was revised and reissued in 1996 as The Ultimate Resource 2.[30]

To the US Congress in 1973, Allen V. Kneese and Ronald Riker of Resources for the Future (RFF) testified that in their view, "The authors load their case by letting some things grow exponentially and others not. Population, capital and pollution grow exponentially in all models, but technologies for expanding resources and controlling pollution are permitted to grow, if at all, only in discrete increments." However, their testimony also noted the possibility of "relatively firm long-term limits" associated with carbon dioxide emissions, that humanity might "loose upon itself, or the ecosystem services on which it depends, a disastrously virulent substance", and (implying that population growth in "developing countries" is problematic) that "we don't know what to do about it".[31]

In 1997, the Italian economist Giorgio Nebbia observed that the negative reaction to the LTG study came from at least four sources: those who saw the book as a threat to their business or industry; professional economists, who saw LTG as an uncredentialed encroachment on their professional perquisites; the Catholic church, which bridled at the suggestion that overpopulation was one of mankind's major problems; finally, the political left, which saw the LTG study as a scam by the elites designed to trick workers into believing that a proletarian paradise was a pipe dream.[32] A UK government report found that "In the 1990s, criticism tended to focus on the misconception that Limits to Growth predicted global resource depletion and social collapse by the end of the year 2000".[33]

Peter Taylor and Frederick Buttle’s interpretation of the LTG study and the associated system dynamics (SD) models found that the original SD was created for firms and set the pattern for urban, global, and other SD models. These firm-based SDs relied on superintending managers to prevent undesirable cycling and feedback loops caused by separate common-sense decisions made by individual sectors. However, the later global model lacked superintending managers that enforce interrelated world-level changes, making undesirable cycles and exponential growth and collapse happen in nearly all models no matter the parameter settings. There was no way for a few individuals in the model to override the structure of the system even if they understood the system as a whole. This meant there were only two solutions: convincing everyone in the system to change the basic structure of population growth and collapse (moral response) and/or having a superintending agency analyzing the system as a whole and directing changes (technocratic response). The LTG report combined these two approaches multiple times. System dynamists constructed interventions into the world model to demonstrate how their proposed interventions improved the system to prevent collapse. The SD model also aggregated the world’s population and resources which meant that it did not demonstrate how crises emerge at different times and in different ways without any strictly global logic or form because of the unequal distributions of populations and resources. These issues indicate that the local, national, and regional differentiation in politics and economics surrounding socioenvironmental change was excluded from the SD used by LTG, making it unable to accurately demonstrate real-world dynamics.[34]

Positive reviews

With few exceptions, economics as a discipline has been dominated by a perception of living in an unlimited world, where resource and pollution problems in one area were solved by moving resources or people to other parts. The very hint of any global limitation as suggested in the report The Limits to Growth was met with disbelief and rejection by businesses and most economists. However, this conclusion was mostly based on false premises.

Meyer & Nørgård (2010)

In 1980, the Global 2000 Report to the President arrived at similar conclusions regarding expected global resource scarcity, and the need for multilateral coordination to prepare for this situation.[35]

In a 2008 blog post, Ugo Bardi commented that "Although, by the 1990s LTG had become everyone's laughing stock, among some the LTG ideas are becoming again popular".[32] Reading LTG for the first time in 2000, Matthew Simmons concluded his views on the report by saying, "In hindsight, The Club of Rome turned out to be right. We simply wasted 30 important years ignoring this work."[36]

Robert Solow, who had been a vocal critic of LTG, said in 2009 that "thirty years later, the situation may have changed... it will probably be more important in the future to deal intellectually, quantitatively, as well as practically, with the mutual interdependence of economic growth, natural resource availability, and environmental constraints".[37]

In a study conducted in 2008, Graham Turner from CSIRO discovered a significant correlation between the observed historical data spanning from 1970 to 2000 and the simulated outcomes derived from the "standard run" limits of the growth model. This correlation was apparent across nearly all the reported outputs. The comparison falls comfortably within the range of uncertainty for almost all the available data, both in terms of magnitude and the patterns observed over time. Turner conducted an analysis of many studies, with a special focus on those authored by economists, that have consistently aimed to discredit the limits-to-growth concept over the course of several years. According to Turner, the aforementioned studies exhibit flaws and demonstrate a lack of comprehension regarding the model.[13]: 37 

Turner reprised these observations in another opinion piece in The Guardian on 2 September 2014. Turner used data from the UN to claim that the graphs almost exactly matched the 'Standard Run' from 1972 (i.e. the worst-case scenario, assuming that a 'business as usual' attitude was adopted, and there were no modifications of human behaviour in response to the warnings in the report). Birth rates and death rates were both slightly lower than projected, but these two effects cancelled each other out, leaving the growth in world population almost exactly as forecast.[38]

In 2010, Nørgård, Peet and Ragnarsdóttir called the book a "pioneering report", and said that it "has withstood the test of time and, indeed, has only become more relevant."[6]

In 2012, Christian Parenti drew comparisons between the reception of The Limits to Growth and the ongoing global warming controversy. Parenti further remarked that despite its scientific rigour and credibility, the intellectual guardians of influential economic interests actively dismissed LTG as a warning. A parallel narrative is currently unfolding within the realm of climate research.[39]

In 2012, John Scales Avery, a member of the Nobel Prize (1995) winning group associated with the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, supported the basic thesis of LTG by stating,

Although the specific predictions of resource availability in Limits to Growth lacked accuracy, its basic thesis – that unlimited economic growth on a finite planet is impossible – was indisputably correct.[40]

Legacy

Updates and symposia

Researchers from China and Indonesia with Dennis Meadows

The Club of Rome has persisted after The Limits to Growth and has generally provided comprehensive updates to the book every five years.

An independent retrospective on the public debate over The Limits to Growth concluded in 1978 that optimistic attitudes had won out, causing a general loss of momentum in the environmental movement. While summarizing a large number of opposing arguments, the article concluded that "scientific arguments for and against each position ... have, it would seem, played only a small part in the general acceptance of alternative perspectives."[41]

In 1989, a symposium was held in Hanover, entitled "Beyond the Limits to Growth: Global Industrial Society, Vision or Nightmare?" and in 1992, Beyond the Limits (BTL) was published as a 20-year update on the original material. It "concluded that two decades of history mainly supported the conclusions we had advanced 20 years earlier. But the 1992 book did offer one major new finding. We suggested in BTL that humanity had already overshot the limits of Earth's support capacity."[42]

Limits to Growth: The 30-Year Update was published in 2004. The authors observed that "It is a sad fact that humanity has largely squandered the past 30 years in futile debates and well-intentioned, but halfhearted, responses to the global ecological challenge. We do not have another 30 years to dither. Much will have to change if the ongoing overshoot is not to be followed by collapse during the twenty-first century."[42]

In 2012, the Smithsonian Institution held a symposium entitled "Perspectives on Limits to Growth".[43] Another symposium was held in the same year by the Volkswagen Foundation, entitled "Already Beyond?"[44]

Limits to Growth did not receive an official update in 2012, but one of its coauthors, Jørgen Randers, published a book, 2052: A Global Forecast for the Next Forty Years.[45][46]

Validation

In 2008, physicist Graham Turner[c] at the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) in Australia published a paper called "A Comparison of 'The Limits to Growth' with Thirty Years of Reality".[13] It compared the past thirty years of data with the scenarios laid out in the 1972 book and found that changes in industrial production, food production, and pollution are all congruent with one of the book's three scenarios—that of "business as usual". This scenario in Limits points to economic and societal collapse in the 21st century.[47] In 2010, Nørgård, Peet, and Ragnarsdóttir called the book a "pioneering report". They said that, "its approach remains useful and that its conclusions are still surprisingly valid ... unfortunately the report has been largely dismissed by critics as a doomsday prophecy that has not held up to scrutiny."[6]

Also in 2008, researcher Peter A. Victor wrote that even though the Limits team probably underestimated price mechanism's role in adjusting outcomes, their critics have overestimated it. He states that Limits to Growth has had a significant impact on the conception of environmental issues and notes that (in his view) the models in the book were meant to be taken as predictions "only in the most limited sense of the word".[12]

In a 2009 article published in American Scientist entitled Revisiting the Limits to Growth After Peak Oil, Hall and Day noted that "the values predicted by the limits-to-growth model and actual data for 2008 are very close."[48] These findings are consistent with the 2008 CSIRO study which concluded: "The analysis shows that 30 years of historical data compares favorably with key features ... [of the Limits to Growth] "standard run" scenario, which results in collapse of the global system midway through the 21st Century."[13]

In 2011, Ugo Bardi published a book-length academic study of The Limits to Growth, its methods, and historical reception and concluded that "The warnings that we received in 1972 ... are becoming increasingly more worrisome as reality seems to be following closely the curves that the ... scenario had generated."[20]: 3  A popular analysis of the accuracy of the report by science writer Richard Heinberg was also published.[49]

In 2012, writing in American Scientist, Brian Hayes stated that the model is "more a polemical tool than a scientific instrument". He went on to say that the graphs generated by the computer program should not, as the authors note, be used as predictions.[50]

In 2014, Turner concluded that "preparing for a collapsing global system could be even more important than trying to avoid collapse."[51] Another 2014 study from the University of Melbourne confirmed that data closely tracked the World3 BAU model.[52]

In 2015, a calibration of the updated World3-03 model using historical data from 1995 to 2012 to better understand the dynamics of today's economic and resource system was undertaken. The results showed that human society has invested more to abate persistent pollution, increase food productivity and have a more productive service sector however the broad trends within Limits to Growth still held true.[53]

In 2016, the UK government established an All-party parliamentary group on Limits to Growth. Its initial report concluded that "there is unsettling evidence that society is still following the 'standard run' of the original study – in which overshoot leads to an eventual collapse of production and living standards".[33] The report also points out that some issues not fully addressed in the original 1972 report, such as climate change, present additional challenges for human development.

In 2020, an analysis by Gaya Herrington, then Director of Sustainability Services of KPMG US,[54] was published in Yale University's Journal of Industrial Ecology.[55] The study assessed whether, given key data known in 2020 about factors important for the "Limits to Growth" report, the original report's conclusions are supported. In particular, the 2020 study examined updated quantitative information about ten factors, namely population, fertility rates, mortality rates, industrial output, food production, services, non-renewable resources, persistent pollution, human welfare, and ecological footprint, and concluded that the "Limits to Growth" prediction is essentially correct in that continued economic growth is unsustainable under a "business as usual" model.[55] The study found that current empirical data is broadly consistent with the 1972 projections and that if major changes to the consumption of resources are not undertaken, economic growth will peak and then rapidly decline by around 2040.[56][57]

In 2023, the parameters of the World3 model were recalibrated using empirical data up to 2022.[58] This improved parameter set results in a World3 simulation that shows the same overshoot and collapse mode in the coming decade as the original business-as-usual scenario of the Limits to Growth standard run. The main effect of the recalibration update is to raise the peaks of most variables and move them a few years into the future.

Related books

Books about humanity's uncertain future have appeared regularly over the years. A few of them, including the books mentioned above for reference, include:[59]

Editions

See also

Books:

Notes

  1. ^ The models were run on DYNAMO, a simulation programming language.
  2. ^ from 1972, so 2072
  3. ^ Dr Turner is an Honorary Senior Fellow with the Melbourne Sustainable Society Institute at the University of Melbourne.

References

  1. ^ "The Limits to Growth+50". Club of Rome. 2022.
  2. ^ a b c d e f g h i Meadows, Donella H; Meadows, Dennis L; Randers, Jørgen; Behrens III, William W (1972). The Limits to Growth; A Report for the Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind. New York: Universe Books. ISBN 0876631650. Retrieved 26 November 2017.
  3. ^ MacKenzie, Debora (4 January 2012). "Boom and doom: Revisiting prophecies of collapse". New Scientist. Retrieved 28 November 2017.
  4. ^ Edwards, Paul N. (2010). A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of Global Warming. MIT Press. pp. 366–371. ISBN 9780262290715.
  5. ^ Forrester, Jay Wright (1971). World Dynamics. Wright-Allen Press. ISBN 0262560186.
  6. ^ a b c Nørgård, Jørgen Stig; Peet, John; Ragnarsdóttir, Kristín Vala (March 2010). "The History of The Limits to Growth". The Solutions Journal. 1 (2): 59–63. Archived from the original on 20 July 2014. Retrieved 1 July 2014.
  7. ^ Farley, Joshua C. "The Limits to growth debate". The University of Vermont. Retrieved 1 December 2017.
  8. ^ Meadows, Donella H.; Randers, Jorgen; Meadows, Dennis L. (1992). Beyond the Limits. Chelsea Green Publishing. ISBN 0-930031-62-8.
  9. ^ Meadows, Donella H.; Randers, Jorgen; Meadows, Dennis L. (2004). The Limits to Growth: The 30-Year Update. White River Junction VT: Chelsea Green Publishing Co. ISBN 1931498512. Retrieved 27 November 2017.
  10. ^ Randers, Jørgen (2012). 2052: A Global Forecast for the Next Forty Years. White River Junction VT: Chelsea Green Publishing Co. ISBN 978-1-60358-467-8. Retrieved 29 March 2019.
  11. ^ Bardi, Ugo; Alvarez Pereira, Carlos, eds. (2022). Limits and Beyond: 50 years on from The Limits to Growth, what did we learn and what's next? A Report to The Club of Rome. Exapt Press. ISBN 978-1-914549-03-8.
  12. ^ a b Victor, Peter A. (2008). Managing without growth : slower by design, not disaster. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. ISBN 978-1-84844-299-3. OCLC 247022295.
  13. ^ a b c d Turner, Graham (2008). "A Comparison of 'The Limits to Growth' with Thirty Years of Reality". Socio-Economics and the Environment in Discussion (SEED). CSIRO Working Paper Series. 2008–09. Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO): 52. doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2008.05.001. ISSN 1834-5638. Retrieved 25 July 2021.
  14. ^ Limits To Growth, pg 60, Derivation: reverts to
  15. ^ The Skeptical Environmentalist, p. 121
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  19. ^ Limits to Growth. 1972. p. 63. Of course, the actual nonrenewable resource availability in the next few decades will be determined by factors much more complicated that can be expressed by either the simple static reserve index or the exponential reserve index. We have studied this problem with a detailed model that takes into account the many interrelationships among such factors as varying grades of ores, production costs, new mining technology, the elasticity of consumer demand, and substitution with other resources
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  21. ^ Kaysen, Carl (1972). "The Computer That Printed out W*O*L*F*". Foreign Affairs. 50 (4): 660–668. doi:10.2307/20037939. JSTOR 20037939.
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  24. ^ Cole, H. S. D.; Freeman, Christopher; Jahoda, Marie; Pavitt, K. L. R., eds. (1973). Models of doom : a critique of The limits to growth (1st, hardcover ed.). New York: Universe Publishing. ISBN 0-87663-184-7. OCLC 674851.
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  26. ^ Meyer, N. I.; Nørgård, J.S. (2010). Policy Means for Sustainable Energy Scenarios (abstract) (PDF). Denmark: International Conference on Energy, Environment and Health – Optimisation of Future Energy Systems. pp. 133–137. Archived from the original (PDF) on 9 October 2016. Retrieved 27 November 2017.
  27. ^ van Vuuren, D. P.; Faber, A (2009). Growing within Limits – A Report to the Global Assembly 2009 of the Club of Rome (PDF). Bilthoven: Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency. p. 23. ISBN 9789069602349. Retrieved 27 November 2017.
  28. ^ a b Alan Atkisson (2010). Believing Cassandra: How to be an Optimist in a Pessimist's World, Earthscan, p. 13.
  29. ^ Simon, Julian (August 1981). The Ultimate Resource (Hardcover ed.). Princeton: Princeton University Press. ISBN 069109389X.
  30. ^ Simon, Julian L (1996). The Ultimate Resource 2 (Paperback ed.). Princeton: Princeton University Press. ISBN 0691042691. Retrieved 6 December 2017.
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  51. ^ Turner, Graham (August 2014). Rickards, Lauren (ed.). Is Global Collapse Imminent? (PDF) (Research Paper No. 4). MSSI Research Papers. Melbourne, Australia: Melbourne Sustainable Society Institute, The University of Melbourne. p. 16. ISBN 978-0-7340-4940-7. Retrieved 19 October 2014. Regrettably, the alignment of data trends with the LTG dynamics indicates that the early stages of collapse could occur within a decade, or might even be underway. This suggests, from a rational risk-based perspective, that we have squandered the past decades, and that preparing for a collapsing global system could be even more important than trying to avoid collapse.
  52. ^ Denby, Claire (18 September 2019). "Is Global Collapse Imminent?". Melbourne Sustainable Society Institute. Retrieved 18 July 2023.
  53. ^ Pasqualino, Roberto; Jones, Aled; Monasterolo, Irene; Phillips, Alex (2015). "Understanding Global Systems Today—A Calibration of the World3-03 Model between 1995 and 2012". Sustainability. 7 (8). MDPI: 9864–9889. doi:10.3390/su7089864.
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  56. ^ Ahmed, Nafeez (14 July 2021). "MIT Predicted in 1972 That Society Will Collapse This Century. New Research Shows We're on Schedule". Vice.com. Study also available here
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External links

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